Making Sense of Downward Causation in Manipulationism. 

With Illustrations from Cancer Research by Malaterre, Christophe
Accepted for publication in History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences
Making Sense of Downward Causation in Manipulationism. 
With Illustrations from Cancer Research
Christophe Malaterre
Institut d’Histoire et de Philosophie 
des Sciences et Techniques
Paris, France
ABSTRACT – Many researchers consider cancer to have molecular causes,  namely 
mutated genes that result in abnormal cell proliferation (e.g. Weinberg 1998); yet for 
others, the causes of cancer are to be found not at the molecular level but at the tissue  
level  and  carcinogenesis  would  consist  in  a  disrupted  tissue  organization  with 
downward causation effects on cells and cellular components (e.g.  Sonnenschein & 
Soto  2008).  In  this  contribution,  I  ponder  how to  make  sense  of  such  downward 
causation claims. Adopting a manipulationist account of causation (Woodward 2003), I 
propose a formal definition of downward causation, and discuss further requirements 
(in light of Baumgartner 2009). I then show that such an account cannot be mobilized  
in support of non-reductive physicalism (contrary to Raatikainen 2010). However, I 
also argue that such downward causation claims might point at particularly interesting 
dynamic properties of causal relationships that might prove salient in characterizing 
causal relationships (following Woodward 2010). 
KEYWORDS –  Downward  causation,  manipulationism,  levels  of  causation,  causal 
granularity, cancer research
1. Introduction 
Garden-variety  examples  of  causation  often  include  smoking  as  the 
alleged cause of lung cancer. For contemporary health science, the search 
for the causes of cancer goes much deeper into minute biomolecular entities. 
Because  of  its  complexity,  the  causal  mapping  of  carcinogenesis  is 
sometimes  compared  to  integrated  electronic  circuits  and  to  the 
identification  of  an  intricate  molecular  circuitry  (Hanahan  and Weinberg 
2000). Over the past decades, the dominant paradigm has been to look for 
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mutated genes, be they oncogenes or tumor suppressor genes, as the cause 
of  abnormal  cell  proliferation  and  cancer  tumors  (e.g.  Weinberg  1998). 
More recently, some alternative research programs have proposed to,look 
for causes of cancer not at the molecular level of genes but at the level of 
tissues or groups of cells: the cause of cancer would not be a faulty gene but 
a disrupted tissue organization; as a result,  carcinogenesis would be best 
understood as a tissue-level phenomenon with downward causation effects 
onto  cells,  for  instance  inducing enhanced cellular  reproduction,  or  even 
onto genes, inducing genetic mutations at particular loci (e.g. Sonnenschein 
& Soto 2008). In this paper, my aim is not to argue which “theory” of cancer 
is  right  or  wrong,  but  rather  to  focus  on  the  philosophical  notion  of 
downward causation.  I propose to analyze downward causation claims in 
light of a manipulationist account of causation (Woodward 2003). I argue 
that such claims need to be asserted with caution and that their metaphysical 
consequences are weaker than asserted. Nevertheless, I also argue that these 
claims  might  point  to  particularly  interesting  characteristics  of  causal 
relationships that have to do with their dynamics, thereby broadening the set 
of  dimensions  along  which  to  characterize  causation  (as  in  Woodward 
2010). The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I briefly present the 
scientific context  of cancer research and the related downward causation 
claims.  In  section  3,  adopting  Woodward’s  manipulationist  account  of 
causation, I propose a formal definition of downward causation. I discuss 
further formal requirements in section 4. In section 5, I argue that downward 
causation  so-construed  cannot  be  used  in  support  of  non-reductive 
physicalism.  In  section  6,  I  discuss  how  downward  causation  might 
nevertheless prove useful by pointing at specific dynamic characteristics of 
causal relationships, and I illustrate this view in section 7. 
2. Organicism and Downward Causation in Cancer Research
In the past fifty years, the field of cancer research has produced hundreds 
of  thousands  of  publications  (Downward 2006)  and seen  a  profusion  of 
schools, visions, or paradigms compete in the search for the ultimate cause 
(and cure) of cancer. Whereas the early vision of cancer as a dysregulation 
of  genetic  expression  was  replaced  in  the  1980s  by  that  of  cancer  as 
resulting  from  the  presence  of  faulty  genes  (oncogenes  and  tumor 
suppressor genes), the complexity of carcinogenesis has become even more 
apparent in the past decade, resulting in a profusion of strikingly different 
approaches that are also typical for biology more generally (Morange 2007). 
Old ideas concerning the role  of autophagy and of senescence are being 
revived, as are those about the place of genomic instability and of metabolic 
alteration  in  carcinogenesis;  epigenetic  theories  are  being  proposed,  that 
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draw,  for  instance,  on  DNA  methylation  and  chromatin  modification; 
evolutionary  models  of  tumor  growth,  including  niche  construction 
strategies,  are  being developed, and the role  of stromal cells,  which was 
once  thought  to  be  peripheral  compared to  that  of  parenchymal  cells,  is 
increasingly being recognized.1
Within this last stream of research, some propose that cancer may result 
from a disruption of tissue organization: carcinogens would cause malignant 
tumors by disrupting the normal interactions between neighboring stromal 
and  parenchymal  cells  (Soto  and  Sonnenschein  2006).  Under  normal 
conditions,  cells  maintain  physical  contact  and interact  with  neighboring 
cells through a combination of junctions: for instance, adherens junctions 
enable the reciprocal anchoring of cytoskeletons and play a role in inducing 
cell structural polarity; gap junctions provide a communication mechanism 
through  which  small  molecules,  including  signaling  molecules,  can  pass 
from one cell to another; tight junctions seal the space between cells and 
prevent the diffusion of solutes through the intercellular space. In addition, 
cells also interact with the extracellular matrix, which is a complex three-
dimensional  network  of  macromolecules  that  serves  as  an  architectural 
scaffold  to  cells  while  also  providing  them  with  contextual  cues.  The 
disruption of these interactions is believed to contribute to carcinogenesis by 
creating a context that promotes tumor growth and protects it from immune 
attack (Bissell and Radisky 2001). For some, this disruption is more than a 
contributing factor and ought to be considered as the real cause of cancer: 
carcinogenesis  would  not  consist  in  a  faulty  gene  that  causes  cells  to 
proliferate, but rather in a disruption of the normal interactions and patterns 
of reciprocal chemical regulations between cells resulting in cells no longer 
being  able  to  “perceive”  their  functional  positioning  and  reverting  to  a 
default mode of active proliferation (Soto and Sonnenschein 2005). Such 
alterations in tissue organization would, in turn, through a complex causal 
chain, induce aneuploidy and mutations. 
Of  course,  since  cancer  is  still  one  of  the  biggest  challenges  of  the 
biomedical  sciences,  such  a  vision  of  carcinogenesis  is  still  in  itself  a 
research program and not yet an accomplished theory. One might therefore 
interpret  this  organicist  stance  as  a  particular  heuristic  strategy,  and  its 
divergence  from  the  more  mainstream  genetic  and  molecular  vision  of 
cancer  as  something  that  will  fade  away  as  the  different  approaches  to 
carcinogenesis are progressively integrated (Malaterre 2007). Yet, some of 
their  proponents claim that the two approaches are  truly incompatible  or 
even incommensurable, in so far as they rely on radically different causal 
sequences  (Sonnenschein  and  Soto  2008,  375)  :  the  cause  of  cancerous 
1Stromal cells constitute the support  tissue of an organ,  whereas parenchymal cells are 
responsible  for  its  function.  This  distinction,  however,  blurs  numerous  reciprocal 
interactions (e.g. Soto and Sonnenschein 2006).
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tumors (associated with a change in tissue organization) would not be DNA 
mutations but disruptions in cell-to-cell interactions (resulting subsequently 
in malignant DNA mutations)2. The intricacy of such cell-to-cell interactions 
makes it practically impossible to sort out cause and effect into neat causal 
chains  at  the  cellular  level  and  leads  to  construing  carcinogenesis  as  a 
tissue-level phenomenon. Tissues, it  is argued, are the locus of reciprocal 
causality  between  cells  and  of  downward  causation  phenomena3. 
Carcinogenesis is even interpreted as providing an experimental argument 
against the causal closure of the physical world (Soto et al. 2008). It seems 
however that such claims are in need of philosophical explication. 
3. Levels and Manipulationism
The very idea of downward causation builds on three presuppositions: (a) 
that  levels  can  somehow  be  defined  in  nature,  or,  in  milder  terms,  be 
attributed to the objects of our theories, such levels being orderly arranged 
so that, for any pair of levels, one might define an upper and a lower level, 
(b) that causal relata, or variables in manipulationist terms, can be ascribed 
to these levels, so that one might define upper- and lower-level causal relata, 
and (c) that some causal  relationships  run from upper-level causal  relata 
down to lower-level causal relata. Let us examine each of these three pre-
suppositions. 
a. Defining Levels
The idea  of  downward causation  goes  hand-in-hand with a  view that 
nature is  structured in levels of organization, from the most  fundamental 
entities  of  particle  physics  up to  the  most  gigantic  ones  of  astrophysics. 
After  all,  aren’t  organisms  composed  of  cells,  cells  of  molecules  and 
molecules of atoms? Nature thus construed appears as fully structured and 
organized, hosting objects that form neatly nested hierarchies of parts and 
wholes, each belonging to given levels of organization. Yet, things are not so 
simple, or so I will argue, for at least two reasons4. 
First, it is not at all clear that a given level can be ascribed once and for 
all  to  any given entity.  Rather,  level  ascription depends on the way one 
2 One may also consider  the extent to which the adoption of  a particular “theory” of 
carcinogenesis might impact the classification of cancer as a disease – see Kutschenko, this 
volume, on the classification of diseases.
3  See also Bertolaso, this volume, on the organicist stance in cancer research.
4In an essay on reduction, Hempel (1969) made comments in this same direction, and more 
specifically  on the  difficulty  of  characterizing  entities  as  being  “physical”,  “chemical”, 
“biological” and so forth, For him, such labels are relative to the conceptual apparatus and 
vocabulary  distinctive  of  each  discipline.  In  the  present  essay,  I  show  that  a  similar 
difficulty  arises  when it  comes  to  assigning  specific  levels to  entities.  I  thank  Werner 
Callebaut for kindly pointing this reference to me.
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chooses to decompose wholes into parts. Consider, in physics, the case of 
the standard model of the atom: an atom is described as being constituted by 
a nucleus surrounded by a cloud of electrons; the level below that of the 
atom therefore seems to be the level nucleus-electron. But if we decompose 
further, we find out that the nucleus is itself composed of nucleons (protons 
and neutrons) that are themselves composed of quarks and leptons. Leptons, 
therefore, are found two levels down below the level nucleus-electron. Still, 
according to physics, electrons too are types of leptons. Hence the hybrid 
composition of the nucleus-electron level that includes entities two-levels up 
from  leptons  as  well  as  leptons  themselves,  depending  on  how  one 
decomposes an atom and ascribes levels to its parts.  The consequence is 
crucial for downward causation5: indeed, should a case of causation between 
a nucleus and an electron be considered a case of downward causation or, 
rather, a case of same-level causation? Similar situations are also frequently 
found in biology when, for instance, ribosomes are sometimes considered as 
molecular entities and therefore placed at the same level as other complex 
organic molecules (e.g. DNA, RNA, or even proteins), but sometimes also 
included among cellular organelles like mitochondria, cellular nucleus and 
endoplasmic  reticulum.  Ascribing  levels  to  entities  is  therefore  not  as 
straightforward  as  one  might  initially  expect  but  depends  on  the 
decompositional approach one takes, that is to say on how one decomposes 
wholes into parts or complex phenomena into simpler ones.
Second,  there  also  exist  entities  that  do  not  clearly  belong  to  any 
particular level of decomposition. Consider an electromagnetic field. Such a 
field  can  play  a  causal  role  at  different  levels:  it  can  accelerate  an 
elementary particle, be it a lepton (e.g. electron) or a nucleon (e.g. proton); 
but it can also deviate the needle of a compass or generate huge aurorae. In 
fact, numerous variables that notably relate to the environment within which 
particular systems are studied appear to play significant causal roles at  a 
whole range of levels. Take the atmospheric pressure: it can play a causal 
role in a chemical reaction in so far as intervening on it changes the output 
of the reaction depending on the vapor pressure of the reactants;  yet the 
atmospheric pressure also plays a causal role in a barometer by displacing a 
column of mercury,  not to mention changes in atmospheric pressure that 
move  clouds  across  oceans.  Similarly,  one  may  consider  that  geometric 
constraints also constitute causal factors that play a role at very different 
levels  of  organization:  for  instance,  changing  the  volume  of  the  optical 
cavity of a laser, in particular the distance of the reflecting walls on which 
the photons bounce in resonance, changes the number of photons that are 
emitted; yet also, changing the volume of a gas while keeping the pressure 
5The focus here is on “downward” (as it appears in “downward causation”). Yet the same 
analysis shows that “upward” is as problematic as “downward”, making cases of “upward 
causation” not as straightforward as one would usually treat them. 
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constant  changes its  temperature.  More generally,  one therefore needs to 
take into account the existence of causal entities or variables that can act at  
different levels of organization without being tied to any level in particular. I 
propose  to  refer  to  such  variables  as  “level-neutral  variables”6.  Because 
level-neutral variables are not particularly tied to any given level, it does not 
make much sense to qualify a causal relation in which they would have a 
stake  as  “downward  causation”.  For  level-neutral  variables,  levels  of 
causation simply are irrelevant. 
Nature thus appears much less neatly organized into levels as one may 
think initially.  Things  are  much more messy,  with  entities  that  might  be 
assigned  to  one  level  or  another,  and  with  others  that  might  interact  at 
multiple levels. The consequence is that downward causation appears ill-
defined in numerous cases. One way to go around this problem is to assert 
that what is characteristic of such causal relationships is not just they point 
“downward” (from entities at  a higher-level down to entities at  a lower-
level), but that they are “mereologically downward” (from a whole down to 
its parts)7. Accordingly, in order to properly define downward causation one 
has to refer to entities that are clearly mapped onto a parts-whole set  of 
relationships.  Downward causation requires a “mereological context” that 
specifies a whole, a set of parts and a set of mereological relationships that 
describes how the parts compose the whole, while ascribing levels to the 
parts relative to each other and relative to the whole. It is only when this 
context is given that level membership ambiguities, as in the case of the 
electron  or  the  ribosome,  are  removed.  And  because  parts-whole 
relationships are required, level-neutral entities like an electromagnetic field 
or the atmospheric pressure are excluded. 
b. Levels and Variables
Once levels have been defined, the second presupposition of downward 
causation  is  that  one  can ascribe  causal  relata  -not  just  entities-  to  such 
levels.  In  manipulationism  (as  in  Woodward  2003),  causal  relata  are 
variables  that  can  take  up  multiple  values,  and  whose  values  can  be 
construed  as  attributes  of  entities8.  The  main  idea  behind  such  a 
6I choose this terminology in reference to C.D. Broad who, in his discussion of emergence,  
proposes to classify the properties of a given “order” or level as “ultimate characteristics” 
(i.e.  emergent),  “reducible  characteristics”  and “ordinally  neutral  characteristics” (1925, 
79). 
7This is simply to acknowledge that, somehow, “big things can interact with small things”. 
The key issue is rather to consider cases of causation between a whole and its parts, as also  
proposed by Kim and his “reflexive downward causation” (1999).
8The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  explore  the  notion  of  downward  causation  in  light  of 
manipulationism, and not to argue that manipulationism is a better account of causation 
than other accounts. Note however that manipulationism appears well suited to causation in 
the health sciences: it fits well with the idea that causes are to be regarded as levers upon  
which to act in order to bring about changes (as is the case with public health); it also suits 
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manipulationist account of causation is that, given a set of variables V and 
given two variables  X and  Y belonging to  V, one can find out whether  X 
causes Y simply by intervening on X and looking at the changes on Y, while 
keeping the other variables in V at some fixed value. A much more precise 
definition of manipulationism can be found in (Woodward 2003); a cause is 
defined as  being  either  a  “direct”  or  a  “contributing  cause”,  each  being 
defined in reference to the notion of “intervention” through the conditions of 
“manipulationism”  M (2003, 59) and of “intervention variable”  IV (2003, 
98).  I  will  take  these  conditions  as  a  starting  point  to  add  further 
requirements in order to define the narrower notion of downward causation. 
As seen above, the very notion of downward causation presupposes that one 
specifies the “mereological context” that includes the entities that the causal 
relata refer to. Since in manipulationism causal relata are causal variables, 
matching “levels” and “causation” requires to impose a joint condition on 
the  causal  variables  and on the entities  that  have,  as  properties,  specific 
values of such causal variables. Hence the following “mereological context” 
requirement:
MC All variables in V are such that their values are attributes of 
entities  for  which  a  “mereological  context”  has  been 
specified (i.e. a whole, a set of parts and a set of mereological 
relationships that describes how the parts compose the whole, 
while ascribing levels to the parts relative to each other and 
relative to the whole).
the  experimental  approach  of  the  health  sciences.  Nevertheless,  for  a  more  general 
overview of diverse causal approaches relevant also to the health sciences, see for instance 
Russo  (2009);  see  also  Russo  (this  volume)  for  a  defense  of  “epistemic  causality”  in 
biomedical contexts.
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c. “Downward”
The  condition  MC,  via  the  specification  of  a  mereological  context, 
enables one to attribute levels to the causal variables that are mentioned in 
the downward causation claim. Yet, according to the third presupposition 
behind downward causation, namely that causal relationships can run from 
upper-level  causal  relata  down  to  lower-level  causal  relata,  a  further 
condition must be added in order to have the “downward” direction of such 
causal relations: the entities of which the values of the cause variables are 
attributes  must  be  such  that  they  belong,  according  to  the  mereological 
context, to a higher level than the entities of which the values of the effect 
variables are attributes. Hence the following “downward” condition: given 
two variables X and Y such that X is a cause of Y, and given MC, the causal 
relation between X and Y is downward iff:
D The values of X are attributes of an entity that is at a higher 
level than the entity of which the values of Y are attributes.
This downward condition is the one that sets the level-directionality from 
top to bottom of the causal relationships relatively to a mereological context 
that itself  specifies the levels among which this level-directionality takes 
place9.
Given a manipulationist account of causation, a downward cause must 
therefore  fulfill  the  following  conditions:  M (manipulationism),  IV 
(intervention  variable),  MC (mereological  context)  and  D (downward). 
These conditions are, however, not sufficient: in particular, they may lead to 
downward  causation  claims  that  are  ill-defined,  depending  on  how  one 
interprets M. It is to this problem that I now turn.
4. Further Requirements for Downward Causation
Despite  being  defined  quite  extensively  in  (Woodward  2003),  the 
manipulationist notion of cause, be it a direct or a contributing one, may 
lead to different formal interpretations. Baumgartner (2009) shows that the 
existence or not of an adequate intervention generates problems when one is 
to  assess  certain  causal  claims,  in  particular  when no such intervention, 
actual  or  counterfactual,  seems  possible.  Such  problems  manifest 
themselves in cases of supervenience of a causal variable, as is typical -but 
not limited- to discussions about mental causation. Consider a variable  X 
that supervenes on a variable Z, for instance a mental state that supervenes 
on a set of brain states, and let us ask whether any of these two variables or 
9One  might  similarly  define  “upward”  and  “same-level”  directionality  conditions,  and 
thereby construe specific notions of “upward causation” and “same-level causation”.
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both can play a causal role with respect to a third variable  Y that we may 
assume to be another set of brain states at a later time (see Figure 1). For the 
sake of simplicity, let us also assume that each of these variables can take 
two values. Which truth values can be attributed to the causal claims (A) “X 
causes Y” and (B) “Z causes Y”? 
As shown by Baumgartner (2009), it all depends on how one interprets 
Woodward’s manipulationist condition M. Because X supervenes on Z, there 
cannot be any change in  X without there being also a change in  Z. As a 
consequence,  any intervention  I on  X will  also make  Z vary.  Yet  if  one 
wishes to assess whether “X causes  Y” is  true, per manipulationism, one 
should be able to identify an intervention  I on  X that would make  Y vary 
while one would hold fixed at some value the variable Z. 
Fig. 1 – A classic illustration of downward causation. Causal relationships (A) and (B) 
are represented by a single arrow, while the supervenience relationship between X and 
Z is represented by a double arrow.
On a strict  interpretation of  M,  because  it  is  impossible  to  identify a 
proper intervention I on X, causal claims such as (A) are deemed to be false 
(see Baumgartner 2009). Yet, in some recent papers, Woodward asserts that 
causal claims that are associated with interventions that are impossible for 
logical,  conceptual  or  metaphysical  reasons,  ought  to  be  qualified  as 
“illegitimate  or  ill-defined”  (Woodward  2008,  224)  rather  than  false. 
Following  this  line  of  thought,  Baumgartner  proposes  a  slightly  weaker 
formalization M’ of M that renders causal claims such as (A) not false but 
simply  ill-defined10.  I  would  argue  that  such  weaker  reading,  though 
10According  to  this  reading  M’,  causation  is  defined  in  the  following  way:  “If  there 
possibly exists an intervention I = zi on X with respect to Y relative to a variable set V such 
that X, Y   V and such that all other variables in V that are not located on a path from X to 
Y are held fixed at some value while I = zi is performed on X, then X is a (type-level) cause 
of Y with respect to V iff Y changes its value or its probability distribution when I  = zi is 
performed on X” (Baumgartner 2009) 
X (x1, x2)
Y (y1, y2)Z (z1, z2)
(A)
(B)
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justified, is accompanied by a major drawback, namely that of leading to 
numerous  cases  of  ill-defined  causal  claims,  contrary  to  our  causal 
intuitions.
Indeed,  any  case  of  supervenience-related  causal  claim,  whereby  a 
supervening  property  might  be  claimed  to  be  causally  relevant,  would 
appear as being ill-defined as soon as one would simultaneously consider 
the  supervenience  basis  of  the  supervening property  in  question.  What’s 
more, adding a variable whose values are attributes of the supervenience 
basis of a supervening property to the set  V of causally-relevant variables 
turns  a  previously  legitimate  causal  claim  (related  to  the  supervening 
property) into an ill-defined one. Consider the following set of variables V = 
{X, Y} where X relates to a traffic light and can take two values: x1 = “red”, 
x2 = “not red”, and Y relates to my driving behavior with y1 = “stop the car”, 
y2 = “continue driving”. Obviously, the traffic light turning to “red” changes 
my driving behavior and makes me stop, thereby justifying the causal claim 
“X causes Y”. Yet, consider the set of variables V’ = {X, Y, Z}, where X and 
Y are the same as above, and Z relates to the wavelength of the light waves 
emitted by the traffic light,  and can take,  for the sake of simplicity,  two 
values  z1 = “700 nm”,  z2 = “a different value than 700 nm”. Because  x1 = 
“red” is  realized by  z1 = “700 nm” but also by other  wavelength values 
(typically between 620 and 780 nm),  X supervenes on  Z.  And when one 
considers  V’,  the  causal  claim “X causes  Y”  relative to  V’ becomes  ill-
defined since one cannot possibly intervene on X while holding fixed Z at a 
given value. Such a strategy of introducing, in the variable set  V, a well-
chosen  variable  Z that  relates  to  the  supervenience  basis  of  any  given 
variable X might turn any causal claim of the form “X causes Y” into an ill-
defined claim. Suffice it to say, this raises questions, not so much about the 
very  account  of  causation in  manipulationist  terms,  but  about  one of  its 
modalities,  namely  the  choice  of  the  variables  that  enter  V.  What  these 
examples show is that supervening variables and variables that relate to their  
supervenience basis ought not be placed in the same set. In other words, 
such  situations  call  for  an  additional  condition  to  be  imposed  on  the 
variables of  V, roughly speaking that of being independent if they are not 
causally related. In this respect, it appears relevant to go back to a particular 
“modularity”  condition  MOD* proposed  by  Hausman  and  Woodward 
(2004) which is precisely about such relative independence of non-causally 
related variables and reads as follows:
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MOD* When Xi does not cause Xj, then the probability distribution 
of  Xj is  unchanged  when  there  is  an  intervention  with 
respect to Xi (2004, 149)
As Hausman and Woodward show, this modularity condition is crucial in 
establishing  the  Causal  Markov  condition  CM within  a  manipulationist 
account of causation that takes as premises such conditions as M and IV11. 
Furthermore, MOD* is crucial in removing known cases where the Causal 
Markov condition CM does not obtain such as cases when V omits common 
causes, when variables are not distinct, when ‘wrong’ variables are defined 
and measured, or when population is selected by conditioning on a common 
effect of variables in V (Hausman and Woodward 2004, 148). 
As a matter of fact,  MOD* is also crucial in removing the downward 
causal  claims  that  are  ill-defined  if  one  follows  Baumgartner’s  weaker 
reading M’ of manipulationism. Indeed, consider the set of variables V that 
includes  both  a  supervening  causal  variable  and  a  variable  from  its 
supervenience basis. One can see in the examples above that refer to the set 
V={X, Y, Z} (Figure 1), that Pr(Z|X)≠Pr(Z) since X supervenes on Z, and that 
therefore  CM fails to obtain. And, similarly, because the probability of  Z 
changes when there is an intervention on  X, while  X is not a cause of  Z, 
MOD* does not obtain either. In sum therefore, making sense of downward 
causation in manipulationism requires one to add an extra condition such as 
MOD* on the set  V of  variables in order not to end-up with ill-defined 
claims12. Hence I propose the following definition of downward causation 
(DC):
11The  Causal  Markov  condition  CM can  be  formulated  as  follows:  “For  all  distinct 
variables  X and  Y in  the  variable  set  V,  if  X does  not  cause  Y,  then  Pr(X|
Y&Parents(X))=Pr(X|Parents(X))” (e.g.  Hausman and Woodward 2004, 147).  (Woodward 
2003)  does  not  assume  CM (hence  imposes  no  such  constraints  on  V),  and  defines 
“causation” on the basis of “intervention”. On the contrary, (Spirtes et al. 1993) and (Pearl  
2000)  assume  CM (hence  impose  constraints  on  V),  and  define  “causation”  and 
“intervention” on this basis (yet, somehow need to justify CM).
12One might rightly argue that adding CM would have the same effect; however, in this 
contribution, I propose to stick to Woodward’s foundational premises for manipulationism 
and to this incremental addition of MOD*. One might also rightly argue that it has not been 
proved  that  MOD* is  necessary  for  removing  the  ill-defined  causal  claims  related  to 
downward causation, and that a weaker condition might be enough: my point here is that 
MOD* is indeed sufficient for no longer having such ill-defined claims, and that I propose 
to define downward causation in such a way.
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DC X is a downward cause of Y relative to V iff: 
(i) M (Manipulationism) and IV (Intervention Variable), i.e. 
in  short  X is  a  cause  of  Y relative  to  V (M being 
interpreted in its weaker reading M’),
(ii) MC (Mereological Context), i.e. in short all variables in 
V are such that their values are attributes of entities that 
fit a mereological context,
(iii) D  (Downward) i.e. the values of  X are attributes of an 
entity that is at a higher level than the entity of which the 
values of Y are attributes,
(iv) MOD* (Modularity), i.e. in short given two variables Xi 
and Xj in V, if Xi does not cause Xj, then the probability 
of Xj is unchanged by an intervention on Xi.
Jointly together, these four conditions make it possible to define precisely 
downward  causation  within  Woodward’s  manipulationism.  So  construed, 
downward  causation  claims  are  well-defined  (i.e.  no  longer  false  as  in 
Baumgartner  2009  or  ill-defined  as  in  Woodward  2008)  and  they  are 
actually ubiquitous13. Yet, as we will see, they cannot perform the job that 
some non-reductive physicalists would like them to do.
5. Downward Causation and Non-reductive Physicalism
A classic argument proposed by some non-reductive physicalists has to 
do with the causal efficacy of higher-level entities. The argument is not just 
that higher-level entities may be endowed with downward causal powers, 
but also that such downward causal powers are somehow novel and cannot 
be accounted for when one sticks to lower-level entities. This argument has 
received  much  support  in  some  domains  of  the  philosophy  of  mind 
literature, in particular when it is argued that mental states have real and 
novel  downward causal  powers  onto  physical  brain states,  and engender 
effects that brain states -upon which they supervene- are argued not be able 
to account for. This argument has been termed the argument of “the causal 
efficacy of the emergents” by Kim and others, and formulated as the claim 
that “emergent properties have causal powers of their own – novel causal 
powers irreducible to the causal powers of their basal constituents” (Kim 
13Consider for instance the set V={X,Y} where X is the variable “John is smoking” and Y 
the variable “John’s lungs develop cancer”. Assuming medical studies have established the 
truth of “X causes  Y” (i.e.  M and  IV obtain), one can see that  MC,  D  and  MOD*  also 
obtain. 
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1999, 22)14. Adopting a manipulationist view of causation, Menzies (2008) 
and Raatikainen (2010) independently argue in favor of this causal efficacy. 
The idea is not so much that higher-level variables can be causally relevant, 
but that lower-level variables may, in some such cases, fail to be causal. As 
Raatikainen  phrases  it,  “a  mental  state  can  truly  be  a  cause  of,  e.g.  a 
behavior, [whereas] more drastically […] the underlying physical state may 
fail  to  be  the  cause”  (Raatikainen  2010).  Based  on  the  definition  of 
downward causation that I have proposed, I will rather argue that, even if 
downward causes can be made legitimate within a manipulationist account, 
they cannot exclude lower-level causes. 
Consider the example discussed by Raatikainen: assume John is at home 
and thirsty; what makes him go to the kitchen? His belief (mental state) that 
there is beer in the fridge or his brain state  B (that underlies his  mental 
state)? Following Raatikainen, this situation can be represented by the set of 
causal variables V={X, Y, Z}, where X refers to John’s mental state, Y to his 
behavior and  Z to  his  brain state,  and where each variable  can take two 
values (Figure 2). 
Fig.  2  – Illustration  of  the downward causation example  presented by Raatikainen 
(2010).  Causal  relationships are  represented by a  single  arrow,  supervenience by a 
double arrow.
Let  us  consider  the  intervention  I  whereby  Peter,  John’s  roommate, 
informs John that  there  is  no  more  beer  in  the  fridge:  I  changes  John’s 
mental state from X=x1=“thinks there is beer in the fridge” to  X=x2=“does 
not think so”, which leads to a change in behavior from Y=y1=“goes to the 
fridge” to Y=y2=“goes to the grocery”. According to Raatikainen, I qualifies 
as a proper intervention and X as a proper cause of Y. Can Z also qualify as a 
14This  argument  can  be  understood  as  a  counter-argument  to  the  “causal  exclusion 
principle”; see for instance Kim (1989). 
Y (y1, y2)Z (z1, z2)
(A)
(B)
with: x1 = “thinks there is beer in the fridge”x2 = “does not think so”
with: y1 = “goes to the fridge”
y2 = “goes to the grocery”
with: z1 = “has a brain state Bthat realizes x1 ”z2 = “does not have this brain state B”
X (x1, x2)
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cause  of  Y?  Raatikainen argues  no.  Granted  the  multiple  realizability  of 
mental states, there should be another brain state  B’ that also realizes the 
same mental state  X=x1=“thinks there is beer in the fridge”. Consider the 
intervention  I’ that would change John’s brain state from B to  B’; such an 
intervention  would  change  the  variable  Z=z1=“has  a  brain  state  B  that 
realizes  x1” to  Z=z2=“does not have this brain state  B”, yet this would not 
lead to a change in the behavior variable Y, since John still “thinks there is 
beer in the fridge”.  Yet from the point  of view of  Z,  I and  I’ cannot be 
distinguished:  both  interventions  on  Z  switch  from  Z=z1 to  Z=z2.  And 
sometimes  Y changes as a result of such intervention, sometimes not. The 
crucial point, according to Raatikainen, is that the counterfactual “If John’s 
brain state B were to be changed by an intervention to not having that state, 
he would have gone to the grocery (and not to the refrigerator)” is false. 
Thereby, Z fails to be a cause of Y. Hence the causal efficacy of higher-level 
variables (such as X) and the causal inefficacy of lower-level ones (such as 
Z). I think there are two problems with this argument. 
The first problem relates to how one defines the set V of variables. If one 
follows  Raatikainen  and  includes  both  a  supervening  variable  X and  a 
variable  Z that relates to its supervenience basis, then one cannot properly 
intervene on X while holding fixed Z at some given value; therefore I does 
not qualify as an intervention, and causal claims such as “X causes  Y” are 
ill-defined (Baumgartner 2009). On the other hand, if one properly defines 
downward causation so as to avoid ill-defined claims (as I have proposed 
above), one cannot simultaneously include X and Z in V, in order to satisfy 
the modularity condition  MOD*. One ought rather to consider  V’={X,  Y} 
and V’’={Z,Y} (see Figure 3). And, relative to the set V’, but not to V, it can 
indeed be argued that X qualifies as a cause of Y and that the claim (A) “X 
causes Y” is true15. 
The second problem relates to the choice of values that variables can 
take. This problem is associated with the question of choosing what Menzies 
and Raatikainen call  the “causal contrast”.  According to Raatikainen, the 
proper contrast for  Z is whether John’s brain state is  B or not, hence the 
choice  of  the  two  values  z1=“has  a  brain  state  B that  realizes  x1”  and 
z2=“does not have this brain state B”. However, as soon as one knows about 
B’ that also realizes X=x1 (and assuming, for the sake of simplicity, that no 
brain state other than  B and  B’ realizes  X=x1) and about  B’’ that realizes 
X=x2, one might as well argue that the proper values one ought to consider 
for Z are z11=“has brain state B that realizes x1”, z12=“has brain state B’ that 
realizes x1”, z2 = “has brain state B’’ that realizes x2”, z3 = “does not have B 
nor B’, nor  B’’” (see Figure 3). Consider then the intervention I’’ whereby 
one would change  Z from  Z=z11 to  Z=z2.  Obviously, such an intervention 
15Strictly speaking, one would need to interpret Raatikainen’s example in such a way that 
Z relates to brain states (as does Baumgartner (2009)) and that MC and D obtain.
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would be followed by a change in John’s behavior, and, contra Raatikainen, 
Z would qualify as a cause of Y, relative to V’’, and the claim (B) “Z causes 
Y” would be true.
Fig. 3 – Two distinct causal claims restated
One might further argue that, anytime a downward causal claim is true, 
there  exists  a  corresponding  lower-level  causal  claim  that  is  also  true. 
Indeed,  suppose  the  downward  causal  claim  (A)  relative  to  V’ is  true 
(Figure 4). 
Fig. 4 –  “Downward” (A) and “lower-level” (B) causal claims 
Then V satisfies MC, and there are lower level entities that compose the 
upper level entity to which  X refers to. When taken together in a certain 
arrangement,  some of  these  lower  level  entities  make it  possible  for  the 
Y (y1, y2)
(A)
with: x1 = “thinks there is beer in the fridge”
x2 = “does not think so”
with: y1 = “goes to the fridge”y2 = “goes to the grocery”
X (x1, x2)
Z (z11, z12 , z2 , z3)
(B)
with: z11 = “has brain state Bthat realizes x1”z12=“has brain state B’that realizes x1”z2 = “has brain state B’’that realizes x2”z3 = “does not have Bnor B’, nor B’’”
Y (y1, y2)
with: y1 = “goes to the fridge”
y2 = “goes to the grocery”
X (x1, x2)
Y (y1, y2)Z (z1, z2)
(A)
relative to 
V’={X, Y}
(B)
relative to 
V’’={Z, Y}
with: z1 = “is in an arrangement of A1”z2 = “is in an arrangement of A2”
Y (y1, y2)
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upper level entity that they realize to be such that X= x1 (resp. x2). Because 
of multi-realizability, there might be many different such arrangements; let 
A1 be the set of all such arrangements (resp. A2). Let Z=zi be the lower level 
property of being in an arrangement that belongs to Ai. Define V’’={Z,  Y}, 
and consider  the intervention  I’’’ that switches  Z from  z1 to  z2.  Then I’’’ 
induces a change in Y, and the claim (B) “Z causes Y” is true. 
Therefore  it  appears  that,  in  agreement  with  Raatikainen,  downward 
causation  is  relevant  within  a  manipulationist  account  of  causation,  yet, 
contra Raatikainen, this downward causation does not exclude lower-level 
causation to  also be relevant,  and is  therefore  of  no help to  the  “causal 
efficacy” argument. 
6. Why is Downward Causation Still Interesting?
Despite this negative result, I think there is still room for enthusiasm over 
downward  causation,  and  that  this  enthusiasm  might  come  from  the 
typological ideal of sorting out causal relations according to some of their 
intrinsic  characteristics:  indeed,  in  addition  to  having  an  account  of 
causation, i.e. what it is for X to be a cause of Y, it is also interesting to see 
whether  there  might  be  different  ways  for  X to  be  a  cause  of  Y  (e.g. 
Woodward  2010). In  other  words,  once  one  has  defined  what  a  causal 
relation is, one might investigate whether there might be different types of 
causal relations and try to identify which characteristics capture the most 
salient  dimensions  of  this  diversity.  It  is  in  this  respect  that  downward 
causation might be interesting, for, as I will argue, it might point to specific 
dynamic features of causal relations. More precisely, the idea is that some 
intrinsic characteristics of causal relationships might influence our choice of 
causal variables. In other words, if  X and  Y end up in the chosen set  V of 
variables, it is not just because  X causes  Y but also because that particular 
causal relationship has specific characteristics that alternatives (e.g. Z causes 
Y) lack.
As already mentioned above, manipulationist causation is relative to a set 
V of causal variables. Yet, often, many variables are available to depict a 
given phenomenon. Take the case of cancer and the over-simplified causal 
relation according to which “smoking causes cancer”. Alternative variables 
to “smoking” could be “smoking cigarettes” or “smoking cigars”, or even 
“inhaling cigarette smoke” or “exposing one’s lungs to tar”; and similarly, 
one can imagine alternative variables to “cancer” such as “lung cancer”, 
“throat  cancer”  or  even “malignant  tumor  growth in  the  lungs”  etc.  An 
obvious  reason  why  some  variables  over  others  end  up  in  V is  simply 
because  there  is  indeed  a  causal  relationship  between  them that  can  be 
assessed  by  an  actual  or  a  counterfactual  intervention.  In  other  words, 
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variables are chosen because they satisfy the “manipulationist” requirement 
M as well as the “intervention variable” requirement IV. And, in the case of 
downward causation, I have just argued that relevant variables ought also to 
meet  the  “mereological  context”  requirement  MC,  the  “downward” 
requirement  D and  the  “modularity”  requirement  MOD*.  All  these 
requirements  put  some  constraints  over  the  choice  of  variables,  yet 
alternatives remain possible, in particular when it comes to the granularity 
of the causal variables one chooses. 
In  this  respect,  variable  fine-graining  may  occur  under  three  distinct 
types  that  I  propose  to  refer  to  as  “disjunctive”,  “conjunctive”  and 
“interpolative”.  Disjunctive  fine-graining  consists  in  splitting  a  causal 
variable X into several causal variables Xi that play similar causal roles, such 
that  X can  somehow be  understood  as  referring  to  either  one  of  the  Xi. 
Consider  the  variable  X associated with the property  “smoking”,  with  X 
taking  different  values  depending  on  the  intensity  of  smoking.  Because 
“smoking”  may  mean  “cigarette  smoking”  or  “cigar  smoking”  or  even 
“passive smoking”, X can be split accordingly into X1 corresponding to the 
property of “cigarette smoking”, X2 to that of “cigar smoking”, X3 to that of 
“passive smoking” etc. In this case, each of the Xi plays a similar causal role 
to that of X with regard to the effect Y= “having cancer”, in the sense that 
one  can  state  “Xi causes  Y”.  Applying  a  disjunctive  fine-graining  to  X 
enables one to investigate more precisely the relative functional causal link 
between the  different  Xi and  Y;  for  instance,  even though we know that 
“smoking causes cancer”, it is also interesting to know whether propositions 
like “cigar smoking causes more severe cancers than cigarette smoking” or 
“passive smoking does cause cancer, albeit to a lesser degree than cigarette 
smoking” are true or not. 
On the other hand, “conjunctive fine-graining” consists rather in splitting 
a causal variable  X into several causal variables  Xj that  can somehow be 
understood  as  jointly  constituting  X.  Consider  again  the  example  of 
“smoking”: this activity consists in a set of sub-activities, such as “lighting a 
match”,  “lighting a cigarette with a match”,  “inhaling smoke”, “exhaling 
smoke”, “putting out the cigarette”, “disposing of the cigarette butt” etc. In 
this case, the  Xj do not play similar causal roles with regard to the effect 
“having cancer”: for instance, “inhaling smoke” is more causally-relevant 
than “disposing of the cigarette butt”. Applying a conjunctive fine-graining 
to  a  given  variable  enables  one  to  identify  more  precisely  which  sub-
activities are indeed causally-relevant, and which ones are not. 
Lastly, “interpolative fine-graining” consists in identifying variables  Zk 
causally in between the cause variable  X and the effect variable  Y. If one 
may say that “smoking causes cancer”, one might also wish to characterize 
more precisely the corresponding causal path, for instance by saying that 
“smoking” causes “lung exposure to tar” that causes “lung tissue injuries” 
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that  causes  “absorption  of  a  carcinogen”  that  causes  etc...  that  causes 
“cancer”. In this case, the different  Zk do not replace any of the previous 
variables X, Y, but rather find their way along the causal path from X to Y. 
“Interpolative fine-graining” enables one to make explicit different crucial 
causal  steps  in  between  a  given  cause  and  its  effect,  thereby  providing 
grounds for more detailed explanations. 
Obviously,  these  three  types  of  causal  variable  fine-graining  are  not 
exclusive  of  one  another  but  can  happen simultaneously16.  They capture 
different strategies when it comes to identifying causal variables with more 
precise roles. Each of these types of variable fine-graining may also come 
with  varying  degrees  of  precision,  thereby  aiming  at  ever  more  minute 
variables. In other words, each of these approaches to identifying ever more 
causally-relevant variables might be pursued more or less deeply to settle at 
a given degree of granularity as represented by that of the variables that end 
up in the set V. In this respect, it is interesting to ask why one settles at one 
particular degree of causal granularity rather than another one. In particular, 
relative to the notion of downward causation, one might ask whether there 
are reasons why one would rather stick to higher-level (and coarser-grained) 
variables than go with lower level (and finer-grained) ones.
The granularity  of  causal  variables  might  first  be  chosen for  a  set  of 
epistemic reasons. Obviously, the variables one selects must be somehow 
available. Yet this availability might be constrained by what we know today, 
that is to say by the current status of our best scientific theories and the 
variables that they manipulate, as well as by the instruments that we might 
use to attribute particular values to those variables. Take again the case of 
cancer. We now know that there are more than a hundred different types of 
cancer  (e.g.  Jemal  et  al.  2008);  it  is  therefore  possible  today  (but  not 
yesterday, so to speak) to choose a variable such as  Yi=“having cancer of 
type Ti” rather than the variable Y=“having cancer”. In addition, one might 
prefer some variables over some others for their meaningfulness relative to a 
particular cognitive context. Current molecular research on carcinogenesis 
does not articulate causal claims at the degree of granularity of variables 
such as X=“smoking” and Y=“having cancer”, which would be meaningless, 
but rather at a deeper degree of granularity where variables are phrased in 
terms of concentration of particular molecular compounds (e.g. carcinogens) 
or activation of particular genes (e.g. oncogenes or tumor suppressor genes). 
In addition to such epistemic reasons, one also finds pragmatic reasons 
for choosing a particular variable  graining rather  than another one.  Such 
pragmatic  reasons  might  have  to  do  with  the  usefulness  of  the  chosen 
16In  addition to  these  three types of  “variable  graining”,  one  should also  consider  the 
degree of “value graining” that each variable might be subject to, and that corresponds to 
the number of different values that the variable may take. In this contribution, I focus only  
on “variable graining”.
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variables  with  regards  to  given  objectives.  For  instance  in  the  health 
sciences, prevention and cure of diseases are of foremost importance. In this 
respect, the very coarse-grained causal claim “smoking causes cancer” can 
be regarded as formulated at the proper degree of granularity provided a 
public policy against smoking is considered as a lever for reducing cancer 
cases.
If  such  epistemic  and  pragmatic  reasons  appear  legitimate,  a  most 
interesting question is whether there might also be some empirical reasons 
for choosing some type and degree of graining rather than other ones. One 
might argue, for instance, that the most elementary entities of physics as 
they  appear  in  quantum theory constitute  the  most  fundamental  level  of 
nature, and that, as a consequence, no finer causal graining might ever be 
achieved. The empirical non-existence of causal variables below that most 
fundamental level might therefore be considered as an empirical constraint 
to  causal  variable  graining.  In  addition,  one  might  ask  whether  some 
intrinsic  characteristics  of  causal  relations  might  also  provide  empirical 
grounds for preferring a given granularity over another one. In some recent 
work,  Waters (2007) and Woodward (2010) propose that  causal  relations 
might be characterized by varying degrees of stability,  proportionality  or 
specificity17. And Woodward, for instance, proposes that such characteristics 
of causal relationships may “lead to the incorporation of more fine-grained 
detail  in  the  specification  of  causes  […]  or  toward  specifications  that 
abstract away from such detail” (2010, 299). In other words, considerations 
of  stability,  proportionality  and  specificity  may  constrain  the  causal 
granularity one chooses and the variables that end up in V in so far as one 
favors  more  stable,  proportional  and  specific  causal  relationships  as 
somehow “paradigmatic” cases of causation. Such considerations stem from 
an analysis of the functional relationship between a cause and an effect, i.e. 
a characterization of how the effect is a function of the cause. I would argue 
that a dynamic characterization of causal relationships might equally prove 
useful in mapping out the different dimensions along which to characterize 
causal  relationships18.  In  what  follows,  I  will  more  modestly  defend  the 
view according to which some downward causation claims might indeed 
point to some such interesting features of causal relationships and that such 
features might also lead to adopting certain degrees of causal granularity 
over others.
17Roughly speaking, stability has to do with whether a causal relationship is somehow 
stable under changes in the background conditions, proportionality with whether changes in 
the cause induce proportional changes in the effect, and specificity with whether a cause is 
indeed specific to a given effect (see Waters 2007 for more on specificity and Woodward 
2010 for all three notions).
18 On the possibility of construing diseases, including cancer, as particular dynamical 
regimes in complex networks, see for instance Gross (this volume).
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7. The Case of Tissue Disruption as a Cause of Cancer
As  indicated  above,  some  scientists  in  cancer  research  advocate  the 
causal  role  of  tissue  dis-organization in  carcinogenesis,  and have  voiced 
claims about downward causation (e.g. Soto and Sonnenschein 2005). Why 
such claims? One of the motives for choosing a tissue-level causal variable 
seems  to  be  the  underlying  complexity  of  back-and-forth  molecular 
interactions  between  cells:  “cancer  is  construed  as  a  tissue-level 
phenomenon  within  which  the  numerous  cellular  interactions  that  occur 
simultaneously  to  maintain  the  structure  of  a  tissue  make  it  practically 
impossible to sort out cause and effect into neat linear causal chains at the 
molecular  level”  (Soto  and Sonnenschein  2005,  115).  As we have  seen, 
under normal conditions, neighboring cells inside tissues interact with one 
another  in  multiple  ways  (via  adherens  junctions,  gap  junctions,  tight 
junctions or the extracellular matrix – see Bissell and Radisky 2001). These 
interactions are not only numerous at the molecular scale but run in multiple 
directions  across  cellular  boundaries.  For  illustrative  purposes,  let  us 
imagine the following causal situation based on a limited number of causal 
variables (see Figure 5). 
Fig. 5 –  Illustration of back-and-forth causal relationships between two cells. 
Suppose that one might  intervene through  I,  for instance by adding a 
carcinogen  nearby  cell  A,  onto  the  signaling  variable  ZA of  cell  A that 
indicates the type of (molecular) signal that cell A sends to cell B; take this 
signal to be either “all is fine” or “something’s not fine”. Imagine that ZA has 
a causal influence on a similar signaling variable ZB of cell B, that indicates 
the type of signal that cell B sends back to cell A. Let us further suppose that 
signals go back and forth between cell A and cell B a certain number of 
times  before  another  variable  YB of  cell  B,  triggered  by  some  sort  of 
Cell A
I
ZA(zA1, zA2)
Cell B
YB(yB1, yB2)
ZB(zB1, zB2)
with: zA1 = “all-is-fine signal”zA2 = “something not fine” yB1 = “do not reproduce”yB2 = “reproduce”
zB1 = “all-is-fine signal”zB2 = “something not fine”
t  
t+1 
t+2 
t+3 
t+4 
t+5 
…
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cumulative effect, changes value from “do not reproduce” to “reproduce”, 
thereby engendering a tumor. 
In this causal model, because ZA, ZB and YB are all cellular variables in the 
sense that they are attributes of cells,  it  appears legitimate to qualify the 
causal  relationships  between  ZA,  ZB and  YB as  cellular,  such  causal 
relationships  being  somehow  instances  of  “same-level”  causation.  Yet, 
because of the back-and-forth interactions between cell A and cell  B, the 
values of ZA and ZB at a given time depend on previous values of these same 
variables. And, strictly speaking, one has as many variables  ZA and  ZB as 
there are time-increments; one might label these variables  ZA,t,  ZA,t+1, ZA,t+2 
etc.  (same  for  ZB).  The  complete  causal  model  at  the  cellular  level  in 
manipulationist  terms  is  therefore  based  on  the  large  set  of  variables 
V={ZA,t, ZA,t+1, ZA,t+2,... ZB,t, ZB,t+1, ZB,t+2, …, YB}. 
Yet, because the different ZA,t,  ZA,t+1, ZA,t+2,... and ZB,t,  ZB,t+1, ZB,t+2, … are 
variables whose values depend on one another, and belong to two different 
cells, one is inclined to group them into a single variable D that would refer 
to both cells A and B, and that would have a causal relationship to YB (see 
Figure 6). 
Fig.  6 –  Illustration  of  a  downward  causal  relationship induced by time-dependent 
variables causally related across distinct lower level entities. The higher level variable 
D  is represented by the large circle;  causal  relationships relative to this new set of  
variables  are  represented  with  regular  arrows;  dashed  arrows  represent  lower-level 
causal relationships.
In this respect, D would be a causal variable at the tissue-level that exerts 
a causal influence on a cell-level variable, YB. And one can show that such a 
situation would fulfill  the formal requirements of downward causation.  I 
would  argue  that  such  cases  of  causation,  within  which  a  “lower-level” 
causal model involves causal relationships that run back-and-forth between 
two variables that are attributes of two distinct “lower-level” entities and 
whose values depend on previous ones, naturally lead to an “upper-level” 
causal model that subsumes under an “upper-level” variable the numerous 
Cell A
I
Cell B
YB(yB1, yB2)
D(d1, d2)
yB1 = “do not reproduce”yB2 = “reproduce”
d1 = “all-is-fine at the tissue level”
d2 = “something not fine”
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lower-level  variables  just  mentioned.  Obviously,  such  a  situation  would 
legitimate a downward causal claim. Yet, most importantly, it is cases like 
this  that  might  indicate  how  particular  dynamic  features  of  causal 
relationships are indeed salient in the sense of influencing the granularity of 
our causal models. Such considerations open up possibilities for  identifying 
dynamic characteristics of causal relationships that might complement the 
functional  ones  already  identified  (e.g.  Waters  2007,  Woodward  2010). 
Whereas the later focus on a characterization of the functional relationship 
between a  cause  and an  effect,  the  former  aim at  capturing  dynamic  or 
temporal features of causal relationships that are not accounted for in purely 
functional terms. What is at stake is to build a more complete picture of the 
different forms that causal relationships might take. 
8. Conclusion
In  this  contribution,  I  have  proposed  a  manipulationist  account  of 
downward  causation  and  discussed  some  ways  in  which  downward 
causation  might  be  understood  as  useful  or  not.  Starting  from  puzzling 
claims about downward causation and non-reductive physicalism in cancer 
research, my first objective was to make sense of the notion of downward 
causation within a manipulationist  account  of causation.  I  have proposed 
several  conditions,  including  the  “mereological  context”  MC and 
“downward” D conditions, to be added to manipulationist conditions such as 
the  “manipulationism”  M,  the  “intervention  variable”  IV and  the 
“modularity”  MOD* conditions.  I  have  then  argued  that,  so  construed, 
downward causation makes full sense yet fails to support the non-reductive 
physicalist  claims of  the “causal  efficacy  of  the emergents”.  I  have  also 
argued that  downward causation claims might  give  good hints about  the 
existence of specific  dynamic causal  relationships  that make higher-level 
variables preferable over lower-level ones, thereby also indicating particular 
characteristics of such causal relationships. Such considerations open up the 
possibility for identifying new and dynamic-related characteristics of causal 
relationships in addition to the functional ones  already identified,  and to 
map out, so to speak, a more complete “morphospace of causation”. This 
may, in turn, impact the usage of causal talk in biomedical contexts, and in 
cancer research in particular.
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